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Fort Benning, Georgia

5 April 1968

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OPERATION OF THE 2d BATTALION, 1st INFANTRY, 196th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEPARATE), IN A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION DURING OPERATION ATTLEBORO 18 OCTOBER 1966 TO 12 NOVEMBER 1966 IN TAY NINH AND BINH DUONG PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A COMPANY COMMANDER.)

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Automatically Downgraded at Two Year Intervals

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Major James P. Thompson

Advanced Course Class No 2

Roster No 182, Advisory Group No 2

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OPERATION OF THE 2d BATTALION, 1st INFANTRY, 196th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEPARATE), IN A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION DURING OPERATION ATTLEBORO 18 OCTOBER 1966 TO 9 NOVEMBER 1966 IN TAY NINH AND BINH DUONG PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A COMPANY COMMANDER.)

PREFACE

The operation presented in this Monograph was a significant part of Operation ATTLEBORO which was conducted by units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate), 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division from 18 October through 12 November 1966.

Due to the increased intelligence reports of Viet Cong caches in the area west of the Saigon River a search and destroy operation was planned in the vicinity of XT4842 commencing 20 October 1966.

Information on the events preceding and following those described in this Monograph may be found in the detailed After Action Reports of the above mentioned units. Small scale search and destroy operations were conducted by the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry with no significant enemy contact being made until the day of 3 November 1966.

Special acknowledgement is given to the After Action Report of the 25th Infantry Division.

Although present on the battlefield as Commanding Officer, Company C, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep), I was not an eye witness to many of the actions contained in the After Action Reports presently on file in the Infantry School Library.

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INTRODUCTION

(U) Intelligence reports indicated that the area selected for Operation ATTLEBORO was one of the largest logistical storage and shipping establishment for the Viet Cong. To exploit this information, the brigade commander committed the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry with the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in the area west of the Saigon River. This same general area had yielded 216.25 tons of rice during a previous operation conducted by units of the 25th Infantry Division in which the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry had taken an active part.

(U) For thirteen days the battalion conducted search and destroy operations with only small scale contact being made and the enemy suffering extensive loss of material and equipment. In response to information received concerning a possible supply cache north of the present area of operation, Alpha company made an airmobile assault to seek out the cache. Within hours after landing, the cache was found and the battalion minus joined Alpha company in the new area.

(C) After the operation had been completed, information received indicated that units of the brigade had possibly made contact with the 1st and 2d Battalion 273d Viet Cong Regiment. Also Company C95, Reconnaissance Company, 9th Viet Cong Division was reported in the area. It also was possible that elements of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment were deployed in the same general area. It appeared that the concentration of units of the 9th

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Viet Cong Division in the area between Dau Teing and Tay Ninh was preplanned and not primarily in response to the search and destroy operations conducted by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

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THE BRIGADE PLAN

In an effort to exploit the intelligence concerning the possibility of a logistical storage site being present in the area, the brigade committed the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry with the mission of finding the storage sites and destroying all supplies and equipment that could not be evacuated. The battalion and its supporting artillery was airlifted by C 123's from Tay Ninh to Dau Teing from 17 - 19 October 1966. The 4th Battalion 31st Infantry moved to Dau Teing as the brigade reaction force. The 3d Battalion 21st Infantry remained at Tay Ninh base camp to conduct patrols, ambushes, and limited search and destroy operations.

THE EXISTING SITUATION

ENEMY:

GENERAL: The enemy encountered in the area offered little or no resistance during the initial stage of the operation. The resistance consisted mostly of ambushes, sniper firing into the perimeter, and the placement of booby traps throughout the area. The area of intensive fighting on 4 and 5 November 1966 revealed that an estimated force of two reinforced battalions had been encountered.

SPECIAL: The enemy encountered on 4 and 5 November 1966 was well trained, aggressive and occupied well fortified and concealed positions. Ammunition and weapons were in sufficient quantity to sustain him against repeated attacks. A large number of automatic weapons were encountered during this period of contact. The morale of the enemy seemed generally good, as evidenced by his willingness to stand and fight and the absence of any personnel being captured or surrendering.

FRIENDLY: The 2d Battalion 1st Infantry was organized as a Light Infantry Brigade and was one of the maneuver battalions of the first Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) to be utilized in Viet Nam. Since its organization, the unit had stressed counterguerilla and jungle type training. Weapons and equipment organic to the battalion are contained in TO&E 7-175T. Tab A.

WEATHER: The weather favored both forces during the operation since there was little precipitation.

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Temperature ranged from approximately 80 - 105 degrees during the day. Visibility in open areas was good. 18

TERRAIN: The area was characterized by low lying terrain with cultivated fields to heavily forested double and triple canopy jungle. The dense underbrush restricted observation and movement. Also it frequently deflected small arms fire, restricted the employment of grenade launchers, and hand grenades. There were a number of large ant hills throughout the area.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT: The abundant vegetation afforded excellent concealment while the ant hills and fallen trees in the area provided good cover. On the ground, observation was severely limited due to the dense underbrush, and it rarely exceeded twenty-five meters.

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THE BATTALION PLAN AND PREPARATION

The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, commanded by LTC Charles Weddle, received the mission to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XT4842 - an area west of the Saigon River. Tab B.

The first element of the battalion departed Tay Ninh base camp on 17 October 1966 by C 123's, and by 19 October 1966 all troops, equipment, and initial supplies were in the forward area. Battery "A", 82d Artillery had closed into Dau Teing with the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry and was ready to support the operation. The battalion commander formulated his plan, assembled his staff, completed his coordination, and issued a warning order to the battalion.

The battalion orders were issued to the staff and company commanders at 1300 hours (approximate time) 19 October 1966. The operation was to begin 20 October 1966; therefore, sufficient time was available for all preparation and planning needed at company level. After receipt of the orders, the company commanders and the operations officer made an aerial reconnaissance of the landing zones to be used in the operation.

Personnel were well equipped and had excellent morale. The equipment was checked, maintenance performed, and weapons test fired. Individuals of the maneuver companies carried as a minimum the following combat load:

1. 300 rounds 5.56 mm ammunition, 30 rounds

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40 mm HE ammunition or 700 rounds 7.62 mm machine gun ammunition, depending on the individual's basic weapon.

2. 4 fragmentation grenades per individual.
3. 2 M-72 LAW per squad.
4. 10 smoke grenade, assorted color, per platoon.
5. 2 meals C-Ration per individual.
6. 4 machetes per platoon.
7. 2 canteen gasoline per platoon.
8. Miscellaneous assortment of explosive with detonation cord and detonators per platoon.
9. Individual clothing and equipment consisted of combat pack, two canteens of water, water purification tablets, salt tablets, entrenching tool, first aid packet, ammunition pouches, and a small sleeping roll.

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NARRATION

The operation conducted in the Dau Teing area during the period 20 - 28 October 1966 was limited to light contact. During this time numerous structures, construction material, boats, and food products were found. The material and usable supplies were evacuated to Dau Teing CIDG camp. Material and supplies not evacuated were destroyed in place after obtaining permission from brigade operations. Tab B.

On 29 October 1966 Company "B" secured the battalion base camp. Company "C" provided security for both the Military Intelligence Detachment which conducted interrogation and the battalion medical personnel which conducted MEDCAP operation in the village vicinity XT461451. Company "A" conducted an airmobile assault into the vicinity XT430488 in response to information received that the area was part of the Viet Cong logistical storage area. Within four hours after landing, the company had discovered 200 tons of rice, 440 gallons of gasoline, and 10 tons of salt. The area proved to be so fruitful that Companies "B" and "C" were airlifted into the area to assist Company "A" and secure the cache. With the arrival of the two companies more enemy supplies and material were found. As the amount of material continued to increase, it became apparent that additional assistance would be needed to evacuate the find. Personnel from the 8th Support Battalion arrived by CH-47 on 30 October 1966 to assist in evacuating the usable supplies. The

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evacuation was completed on 2 November, 1966, and the battalion moved north to continue its search and destroy mission.

Detailed narration of the battalion's operation for the period 3 through 6 November, 1966 is contained in the following pages of this monograph as subtitles. The highlight of the entire operation is the contact made during the period 3 through 5 November 1966.

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THE APPROACH

On 20 October 1966 the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area of operation utilizing two landing zones. Companies "A", "C" and the Command Group landed vicinity of XT483428 and Company "B" landed vicinity of XT455436. TAB B. The artillery preparation shifted from the landing zone utilized by Companies "A" and "C" to the landing zone utilized by Company "B" as the lift helicopters approached the landing zone. The gunships accompanying the lift helicopters laid down suppressive fire as the troop carrying helicopters approached the area. The door gunners of the first lift sprayed likely areas for concealed enemy as the lift helicopters entered the area to touchdown. The troops in the first lift landed and immediately established positions to secure the landing zone for the following lifts. After the last lift was completed the commanders organized their companies into march formation and started moving in the direction of Company "B". Each company utilized a verison of the box formation during search and destroy missions. This formation allowed the unit to make a major change in direction without the necessity of stopping. Upon receipt of fire from any direction, the unit could change direction to return fire by executing a face movement and proceeding in that direction. The Battalion Commander, Artillery Liaison Officer, Battalion Sergeant Major, and two radio operators operated from a command and control helicopter in orbit over the area.

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The Air Force Forward Air Controller operated over the area in an L-19. The Battalion Operations Officer controlled the command group on the ground with the maneuver companies.

Company "B" landed on a cold landing zone. After consolidating, the company moved east into an area to establish blocking positions vicinity of XT459435. TAB B.

Companies "A" and "C" linked up with Company "B" late that evening and established the battalion base for the night. Resupply was accomplished while defensive positions were being prepared. The next day the companies departed the base and conducted search and destroy operations through out the area.

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THE SEARCH AND DESTROY

The search and destroy operation conducted from 20 October through 2 November 1966 was characterized by limited enemy contact and the finding of numerous structures, construction materials, boats, food product, punji pits, ammunition, tunnels, and documents. A hospital complex consisting of 27 structures above and below ground was also found. Medical supplies, clothing, rice, salt, milk, and peanuts were found in the complex. There were no significant problems encountered during the operation. A major portion of the operation statistics are contained in TAB C. On occasion it was necessary to sit in an area securing a cache while waiting for permission to destroy or evacuate these supplies. During these periods the units were subjected to sniper fire in spite of out posts and local patrolling in the area. Chronological listing of daily search and destroy operations for the period 20 October through 2 November 1966 are contained in TAB D as reported in the "Operational After Action Report, 25th Infantry Division".

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THE VIET CONG CONTACT

3 November 1966 the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry moved north enroute to their designated objectives. TAB G. Company "B" and "C" moved along axis RED. Company "A" moved along axis BLUE. At 1148 hours Company "B" became engaged with an unknown number of Viet Cong employing small arms, automatic weapons, and claymore mines in the vicinity of XT439509. Frontal or flank attacks by Company "B" against the enemy failed repeatedly. Company "C" attempted to attack the enemy position on the left flank of Company "B" but was unable to penetrate the enemy's defense from that direction. DUST OFF was needed to evacuate the casualties of Company "B". As the DUST OFF was being accomplished, an air strike was placed on the enemy within 75 meters of the two companies. The air strike silenced the enemy and the companies were able to move again. The area was not accessed for damage caused by the air strike.

With more than three thousand meters to travel to effect a link up with the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and due to the lateness of the day, a fast pace was set by the leading company. This resulted in heat casualties in both units. While DUST OFF was being accomplished for these heat casualties from the vicinity of XT429505, the battalion commander, who had been with Company "A" on the east, joined the two companies. While monitoring the battalion command NET, he had kept abreast of the situation and had ordered

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helicopters to extract us from our present position and transport us to landing zone 1. TAB B. The helicopters arrived and extracted Company "B". Company "C" secured the pick up zone until the helicopters returned. After landing on landing zone 1, the battalion minus assumed responsibility for a section of the perimeter. Resupply was accomplished and the units prepared defensive positions for the night.

Throughout the night, the enemy probed the perimeter with sniper fire. Fire discipline was good in the units manning the perimeter. No one fired his weapon at shadows or noises except the grenadier. The grenadier would fire a round so that the exact location of any position could not be accurately determined by the enemy.

With breakfast and the extraction of the night kits completed, the units made preparation to begin the mission for the day. Orders for 4 November, 1966 required the brigade forces to attack north in an effort to consolidate all subordinate units and prevent the Viet Cong from infiltrating south into the area of operation. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry moved northeast to link up with Company "A" and continue on to a predetermined objective.

Company "B" was leading the battalion minus, Company "C" brought up the rear. The going was slow and the units moved through the dense jungle without incident for approximately three hours. The jungle appeared quiet and peaceful as the units made their way

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deeper and deeper into the coolness offered by the trees. Suddenly, from the left flank there was an outburst of heavy firing and bullets flew overhead. The company immediately hit the ground and faced in the direction of firing. Company "C" Commander contacted the operations officer, and learned that a friendly unit had made contact with Charlie. Bravo and Charlie companies were to remain in their present positions until needed or until the unit had broken contact.

Time passed, but the unit was unable to break contact or defeat the enemy. Company "C" was ordered to attempt a breakthrough of the enemy's position and assist the engaged unit. Using the sound of firing as a guide, the company moved in the direction of the sound to link up with the unit. The underbrush was heavy and paths had to be cut as it moved in a company column through the jungle. The order of march was 1st platoon, command group, 3d platoon, 4th platoon, and 2d platoon. The company had travelled for about two hours when the point came under heavy fire from the enemy who was located in well fortified bunkers and trees. Casualties were sustained from the initial burst of fire and the company deployed to assault the enemy positions. The company was approximately 300 meters from the friendly forces at this time.

The assaults on the enemy positions were unsuccessful, therefore the second platoon attempted to outflank the enemy by maneuvering to the right. It was brought

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under fire which stopped its' forward progress. A base of fire was laid down which enabled the casualties to be recovered and contact to be broken. After breaking contact the company withdrew fifty meters and made radio contact with Bravo company. The radio contact established the location of Company "B" and while looking for another route into the area which was less heavily guarded or fortified, the company linked up with Company "B". Together, they entered the lines of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was not in contact with the Viet Cong.

At this location the casualties were turned over to the Battalion Headquarters Section for evacuation. The Company Commander, Company "C" located the operations officer and was instructed to go forward to receive a briefing from the company commander facing the Viet Cong. The company commander went forward and located the commander of the unit facing northeast. Information received indicated that the Viet Cong were a mere one hundred to one hundred fifty meters in front of the perimeter where we were located and directly between the perimeter and Company "C" 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry.

C/P/27
P

Bravo company was given the mission to defend a sector of the perimeter. Charlie company cleaned their weapons, acquired a resupply of ammunition, and ate its first meal since starting the operation for the day. As darkness fell, Charlie company received orders to penetrate the enemy lines and link up with the stranded unit. The platoon leaders were advised of the situation

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and given the march order of first platoon, command group, second platoon, and third platoon. The fourth platoon remained within the perimeter. The platoon leaders departed to advise their personnel of the mission and as the appointed hour for departure arrived the company moved toward the perimeter. Everyone was tense as the company moved forward to coordinate the passage of lines with Bravo company. Utilizing a daisy chain to keep from becoming separated, all went well as the company progressed deeper and deeper into the darkness of the night. The unit progress was followed by the noise they made while moving through the bushes and the radio communication between the stranded unit and the intended rescue unit.

PP-1/B

The commanding officer was advised of a machine gun position to the units' left as it moved forward. Just as the message was acknowledged, the gun started firing. The company shifted to the right in order to avoid this gun position. It moved about thirty meters before again becoming engaged by automatic weapon fire. This time the firing came from two directions. The underbrush had been cut away and the company found itself in a firing lane. The unit immediately got out of this lane, gathered the casualties and took a count of its effective fighting strength.

X

The company had less than fifty effective fighting men remaining. The commanding officer advised the operations officer of the situation and was ordered by the operations officer to reenter the perimeter. All wounded personnel were recovered with the exception of

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the point man. He could not be found during the search of the area due to the enemys' fire and darkness limiting visibility. After what seemed to be an eternity - in reality only 3 hours - the company reached the perimeter and re-entered friendly lines. Working into the early morning we were finally able to get all of the casualties to the landing zone. Again the Headquarters Section took over the evacuation of the wounded. The men from Charlie company fell from exhaustion wherever they could find a place to rest. Daylight arrived, allowing us the opportunity to gather everyone again.

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THE VIET CONG FLIGHT

The arrival of another day meant the assignment of another mission. Company "C" relieved Company "A", 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry of its mission of securing the landing zone being used for this operation. After two unsuccessful attempts to reach the unit, the battle was over for Company "C". Company "A" would now make the attempt. The company moved forward and came under enemy fire within minutes of clearing the perimeter. Casualties were brought to the landing zone for evacuation. The company assaulted the positions, but was not able to move past the bunkers occupied by the enemy. Company A, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry was not able to penetrate farther into the enemy lines, therefore they began to withdraw with the casualties under cover of their own fire.

Meanwhile Company A, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry and other friendly forces moved toward Company C, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry from the northeast. The units attacking from the northeast were within 200 meters of Company "C's" perimeter. Around 1400 hours 5 November 1966, Company A, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry reached the perimeter of the besieged unit. There were twenty-one Viet Cong bodies around the perimeter. Alpha company brought out the personnel of this unit including the dead and wounded.

*cfh
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The unit was extracted immediately from the battle area. Once the unit had been rescued, air and artillery

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was called in on the enemy positions and the fighting was over for the day. The enemy had been killed, buried alive, or escaped. The sad ordeal of policing the battle field of the dead, wounded, weapons, and other equipment began. The point man who could not be found the previous night was found, tagged, and evacuated. The evacuation continued late into the evening, and nightfall found the units occupying their original positions.

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THE EXTRACTION

The 1st Infantry Division assumed operational control of the brigade and continued the assigned mission at 0900 hours 6 November 1966.

The brigade units prepared to be extracted from the landing zone which had been heavily used during the past two days. At approximately 1300 hours the extraction began with the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division being the first unit out. Following the 27th Infantry was the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry; 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry; 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep). All units except the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry returned to their base camp. The extraction was completed at approximately 1700 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry were released from operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and returned to base camp. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry remained in the Dau Teing area to conduct local search and destroy operations. The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry and 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep) returned to base camp at Tay Ninh. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry was released from attachment to the 1st Infantry Division and airlifted to Tay Ninh base camp on 12 November 1966.

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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. Indications are that ATTLEBORO completely disrupted the Viet Cong plans for a major winter offensive by the 9th Viet Cong Division and the 101st North Viet Nam Army Regiment.

2. The battalion fought a well armed, and determined enemy who occupied excellent defensive positions. The two most outstanding factors that dominated the events of this fight were the enemy's decision to hold his position and fight at close quarters for a sustained period, and the extraordinary degree of valor and courage shown by members of the U.S. Forces.

3. This mission had been the first real battle for the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep). The men reacted calmly to the situation and functioned in the manner that they had been trained for, counter guerrilla and jungle fighting, since organization day.

4. The failure to access the area of damage on 3 November 1966 was an oversight on the part of the two company commanders and the operations officer. The correct procedure would have been to enter the area to ascertain the amount of damage done by the air strike and gather any documents or other material and equipment that may have been of intelligence value. If the Viet Cong were still in the area, the units should have remained in the general location and reengaged him the

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next day.

5. A location of the unit in contact should have been obtained by Company "C" so that the company would have been travelling to a determined location instead of travelling in the direction of firing.

6. A command and control helicopter on station that afternoon of 3 November 1966 would have been a valuable aid in our encounter with the enemy. Information could possibly have been given relative to the location of the friendly forces and the enemy forces.

7. The units' progress during the hours of darkness could have been followed by the noise made. This made a near perfect ambush situation for the Viet Cong since they were already occupying positions, and the company did not know exactly where these positions were, nor where it was going or the best route to take in order to reach its destination safely.

8. The inability to reconnoiter the Viet Cong position proved to be costly to the company attempting to link up with the engaged unit. A reconnaissance of the area may have worked to the advantage of the rescuers in that the enemy may have been taken by surprise if their exact location had been known.

9. The limited use of air and artillery fire power due to the closeness of the combatants could possibly have been overcome by units that were able to break contact, withdrawing to allow the engaged company to call

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for this fire support.

10. The piecemeal commitment of the units into the area of battle resulted in their suffering casualties that may have been avoided if the companies had been committed in a coordinated attack to rescue the stranded unit.

11. The inability to reinforce company "C" quickly because of the dense jungle and the Viet Cong located around them, makes it only too clear that reinforcing a unit in the jungle is an operation that requires planning, practice and determined men.

12. The lack of intelligence pertaining to the enemy presence in the area possibly contributed to the unit being caught unaware of a large size enemy unit being present at that location. During the fighting, there were still no information received from higher headquarters concerning the enemy.

13. The placement of crew-served weapons indicated the enemy possessed a knowledge of the use of grazing fire technique to deny utilization of avenues of approach.

14. The absence of any prisoners and the determined method of fighting indicated that the enemy's morale was good. The Viet Cong used all available natural cover and concealment to his advantage. Positions were well camouflaged allowing the Viet Cong to observe the movement of friendly forces without being observed. Tree type firing platforms were used extensively.

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15. It will probably never be known why the enemy decided to stand and fight in this instance instead of his usual tactic of breaking contact quickly and "fading" into the jungle.

16. One landing zone was used by four battalions with no centralized control for resupply or evacuation operation. This resulted in excessive confusion, loss of time, and equipment by all units.

17. Units should not attempt to link up with the flank of another unit in the dense jungle. They should approach from the rear to effect the link up if at all possible. Knowledge of the units actual location is a must to effect a successful link up under fire.

18. Sustaining additional casualties while attempting to retrieve wounded was prevalent during the action. There is no set solution concerning this problem and must be met and solved by each commander on the ground during a particular operation.

19. Search of Viet Cong structures improperly resulted in units sustaining several casualties from booby traps. Proper techniques were used initially, however, upon finding nothing and a cache was found other personnel would enter and start removing the cache. A booby trap hidden in the supplies would be detonated causing multiple casualties.

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TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

1. Advance guards should be employed when moving in the jungle because they provide early warning.
2. Air and artillery fire support must be used in conjunction with ground troops.
3. Units that are heavily engaged should not attempt to police battlefield of casualties until after the battle has been won. The company aidman normally will do what he can until additional help arrives.
4. The exact location of units in contact must be known prior to attempting to link up so that casualties will not be taken from friendly fires and the enemy avoided if possible.
5. Proper techniques for searching supply cache or building must be stressed. Personnel must assume that everything is booby trapped and proceed with caution when evacuation captured material.
6. There is no set policy concerning the recovery of wounded personnel on the battle field. This problem must be met and solved by each commander on the ground during a particular operation.

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
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RIFLE CO INF BATTALION, LIGHT INF DIV
OR
INF BATTALION, SEPARATE LIGHT INF BRIGADE (TOE 7-177T)

MISSION:--To close with the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to Infantry Battalion, Light Infantry Division or Separate Light Infantry Brigade, TOF 7-175T.

CAPABILITIES:--Close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him. Repel enemy assault by fire, close combat and counterattack. Provide a base of fire and maneuver elements. Seize and hold terrain of tactical importance. Operate in all types of terrain and climatic conditions. Capitalize on all forms of mobility. Conduct air assault operations. Conduct long range patrolling.



RIFLE PLATOON HQS (9)

1 LT. Plat Ldr 1542
 1 PSC Plat Sgt 1149

1 LT. Plat Ldr 1542
 1 PSC Plat Sgt 1149
 1 PSC Plat Sgt 1149
 1 PSC Plat Sgt 1149

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 CPT Co Comdr 1542 11
 1 LT XO 1542
 1 1SGT First Sgt 11G50
 1 SSG Sup Sgt 76K40
 1 SGT Comm Chief 31F40
 1 SP4 Armorer 76K30 40
 1 SP4 Co Clerk 71H20 12
 1 SP4 Field Svbd Op 36A10
 1 SP4 Rdo Mech 31B20
 2 PFC Rdo Tel Op 11B10

Detector kit chemical agt . . . 1
 Lchr gren 40mm 2
 Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
 Radio set AN/GRR-5 1
 Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
 in trk 1/4-T 1
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 4
 Swbd tel manual SB-993/GT . 1
 Telephone set TA-312/PT . . 2
 Metascope asmy image
 infrared tranzd 1
 Radiacmeter IM-93/UD . . . 2
 Radiacmeter IM-174/PD . . . 1

TP
p
oc 167

1 LT Plat Ldr
 1 PSG Plat Sgt
 1 PFC Rdo Tel Op
 Flamethrower portable . . . 1
 Detector kit cml agt 1
 Radio set AN/PRC-6 2
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 1
 Telephone set TA-1/PT 5
 Metascope asmy image
 infrared tranzd 1
 Radiacmeter IM-93/UD 2
 Radiacmeter IM-174/PD 1

RIFLE SQUAD (9)

1 SSG Sqd Ldr 11B40
 2 SGT Tm Ldr 11B40
 2 SP4 Auto Rifleman 11B20 12
 2 SP4 Grenadier 11B20
 3 PFC Rifleman 11B10
 Lchr gren 40mm 2
 Radio set AN/PRC-6 1

WEAPONS SQUAD (3)

1 SSG Sqd Ldr 11B40
 2 SP4 Gunner 11B20 13
 2 SP4 Mach Gunner 11B20 11
 2 PFC Ammo Bearer 11B10
 2 PFC Asst Gunner 11B10 13
 2 PFC Asst Mach Gun-
 ner 11B10 11
 Lchr rkt 3.5-in 2
 Gun mach lt flex 2
 Radio set AN/PRC-6 1

1 SSG
 2 SP5 Fire Dir Crnpt 11C20 41
 2 PFC Rdo Tel Op 11C10 42

Lchr gren 40mm 1
 Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
 Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
 in trk 1/4-T 1
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 5
 Swbd tel manual SB-993/GT . 1
 Telephone set TA-312/PT . . 5

81MM MORTAR SQUAD (3)

1 SGT Sqd Ldr 11C40 11
 1 SP4 Gunner 11C20 11
 3 PFC Ammo Bearer 11C10 43
 1 PFC Asst Gunner 11C10 12
 Lchr gren 40mm 1
 Mortar 81mm on mount 1
 Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifle
 7.62mm lt calibre unless other-
 wise indicated.
 01 Also lt truck driver.
 11 Armed with pump action automatic cal
 .45.
 12 Armed with launcher grenade
 40mm and pistol automatic cal
 .45.
 13 Armed with rifle and M72 law.
 40 Remarks 01 and 12 apply.
 41 Remark 12 applies to 1 EM.
 42 Remark 01 applies to 1 EM.
 43 Remark 01 applies to 1 EM per
 squad.

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

AJIS-D-IMD

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Advanced Course Staff Studies

TO Dept Directors, USAIS

FROM DI

DATE 15 Apr 68

CMT 1

CPT Vice/jac/5555

1. As provided in paragraphs 3a(2) and paragraphs 4a. b., USAIS Regulation 350-15, 27 Oct 67, the attached IOAC 2-68 staff studies/monographs are forwarded for technical evaluation, which will result in 40 percent of the student's grade. Two copies of the grade key are inclosed with each staff study/monograph. The grader should use one key as a work copy and type his final comments on the other copy. The latter should be returned with the staff study/monograph as completed but NLT 17 May 68 to IMD.
2. The staff studies/monographs will be placed in the USAIS library; therefore, marks and comments should not be made directly on the staff studies/monographs.
3. Graders will generally find it helpful to refer to previous student staff studies on the same or similar subjects. These studies are kept in the documents section of the USAIS library.
4. Content evaluators should be attentive to the possibility of the appearance of classified material in some studies. If this occurs, the Chief, Effective Writing Branch, should be contacted immediately. Staff studies should not contain classified information; however, in some instances classified material was inadvertently included. The inclosed memorandum concerning classified information should be signed by the content evaluator.
5. Monographs can contain classified information; however, if classified information is encountered in a monograph that has not been formally classified, Chief, EWB, should be contacted immediately.

3 Incl
as


WE Manjin
WILLIAM E. SMITH
Colonel, Infantry
Director of Instruction

**INFANTRY BATTALION LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
OR
INFANTRY BATTALION SEPARATE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (TOE 7-175T)**

MISSION:--To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to Light Infantry Division, TOE 77T and to the Separate Light Infantry Brigade, TOE 77-100T.

CAPABILITIES:--Close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to capture or destroy him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack. Provide base of fire and maneuver elements. Seize and hold terrain for limited periods of time. Conduct independent operations on a range of terrain. Provide communication and issue of anti-aircraft fire, reduced anti-tank fire and limited logistical support. Conduct long-range patrolling. Operate in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.



INFANTRY BATTALION RECAPITULATION

VEHICULAR

| | |
|---|----|
| Trk amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl | 10 |
| Trk cgo 3/4-T 2 whl | 2 |
| Trk cgo 1 1/2-T 2 whl | 5 |
| Trk amb frontline 1/4-T 4x4 | 2 |
| Trk cgo 3/4-T 4x4 | 6 |
| Trk cgo 2 1/2-T 6x6 | 8 |
| Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 | 22 |
| Trk util 1/4-T carrier for 106mm rifle | 8 |
| Util veh 2 whl | 2 |

SURVL & COMM EQUIP

| | |
|---|----|
| Detector kit cml agt | 22 |
| Radio set AN/GRR-5 | 5 |
| Radio set AN/GRC-106 mtd in trk 1/4-T | 1 |
| Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd in trk 1/4-T | 15 |
| Radio set AN/PRC-6 | 54 |
| Radio set AN/PRC-25 | 68 |
| Radio set AN/PRC-41 | 1 |
| Radio set AN/PRC-47 | 5 |
| Radio set AN/VRC-24 | 1 |
| Radio set AN/VRC-46 mtd in trk 1/4-T | 1 |
| Radio set AN/VRC-49 mtd in trk 1/4-T | 1 |
| Radio set control Gp AN/GRA-39 | 1 |
| Radio set control Gp AN/GRA-74 | 2 |
| RATT set AN/VSC-2 | 1 |
| Comm Central AN/ASC-5 | 1 |
| Elec TT set eq TSEC/KW-7 | 1 |
| Metascope asmbly image infrared tranzd | 16 |
| Swbd telephone SB-993/GT | 6 |
| Swbd telephone SB-22/PT | 3 |
| Telephone set TA-1/PT | 45 |
| Telephone set TA-312/PT | 54 |
| Radiac set AN/PDR-27 | 1 |
| Radiacmeter IM-93/UD | 51 |
| Radiacmeter IM-174/PD | 27 |

ARMAMENT

| | |
|---|-----|
| Flame thrower PTBL | 9 |
| Lehr gren 40mm | 86 |
| Lehr rkt 3.5-in | 18 |
| Gun mach lt flex | 20 |
| Mort 81mm on mount | 13 |
| Pistol auto cal .45 | 202 |
| Rifle 106mm on mount | 8 |
| Rifle 7.62mm semi-auto lt barrel | 567 |

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OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

ENEMY LOSSES

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| VC KIA (BC) | 254 |
| VC KIA (POS) | 237 |
| VCC | 6 |
| VCS | 60 |
| Detainees | 19 |

EQUIPMENT

| | |
|---------------------------------|------------|
| Field Expedient Rocket Launcher | 1 |
| 60 mm Mortar | 1 |
| M 79 Grenade Launcher | 2 |
| Shotgun | 2 |
| CHICOM SMG | 1 |
| THOMPSON SMG | 1 |
| BAR | 2 |
| CHICOM Rifle | 3 |
| CHICOM 7-62 Rifle | 2 |
| CHICOM Carbine | 2 |
| M-1 Rifle | 3 |
| Russian Rifle | 2 |
| French MAS-36 Rifle | 1 |
| Rifle Unknown type | 3 |
| US Carbine | 3 |
| Homemade Rifle | 3 |
| 9 mm Pistol | 1 |
| Homemade Pistol | 1 |
| Cross Bow | 1 |
| Small Arms ammunition | 588 rounds |
| Hand Grenade | 104 |
| Rice | 401 tons |
| Tin | 680 sheets |
| Refrigerator | 2 |

TAB C

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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
(3: 13, 14, 15 and 16)

18 October 1966 - The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry commanded by LTC Charles Weddle commenced air movement of troops and supplies to Dau Teing to conduct search and destroy operations in the area vicinity XT 4842 north to Soui Ba Hoa (XT4156) part of a large Viet Cong logistical base controlled by Group 82, Forward Rear Service, COSUN as revealed by an analysis of captured documents.

19 October 1966 - The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry completed their air movement to Dau Teing and made preparation to commence operations on 20 October 1966.

20 October 1966 - The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry conducted an airmobile assault vicinity XT483428 with Companies A and C and vicinity XT455436 with Company B. Company B set up a blocking position while Companies A and C drove against it.

21 October 1966 - Company B discovered 13 tons of rice, 500 cans of milk, 1000 pounds of salt and 2500 pounds of peanuts vicinity XT460420. These items were destroyed.

22 October 1966 - Company C discovered 3630 pounds of cement and 20 1 x 12 inch planks vicinity XT481427. Part of this find was evacuated.

23 October 1966 - Company B conducted search and destroy operation from vicinity XT483421 to vicinity XT489400, resulting in 2 tons of rice, 15 pounds of sulfa drugs and 150 pounds of epsom salt captured and 6 Viet Cong structures, 10 pounds of TNT and 7200 pounds of fish being destroyed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24 October 1966 - Company A and B conducted a joint operation in vicinity XT4542 resulting in 1 Viet Cong KIA (BC), 3 Viet Cong structures, 2 foxholes, 2 underground fortifications, 2 tunnels and 400 pounds of wheat destroyed.

25 October 1966 - Search and destroy operation in vicinity XT4542 resulted in negative contact or find.

26 October 1966 - Search and destroy operation in vicinity XT485414 resulted in light contact. Results were 2 Viet Cong KIA possible. The units made no find of supply caches during this days operation.

27 October 1966 - Search and destroy operation was conducted from vicinity XT451431 to vicinity XT487422 resulting in 1 Viet Cong KIA (BC), 8 Viet Cong KIA (possible) and 8 Viet Cong suspects apprehended.

28 October 1966 - Search and destroy operation was conducted from vicinity XT487422 to vicinity XT442448 resulting in 34 Viet Cong suspects apprehended. Eighteen of the 34 suspects apprehended proved to be on the black list contained in the intelligence section.

29 October 1966 - Company A conducted an airmobile assault into vicinity XT430488 resulting in 420 tons of rice and 15 tons of salt captured. Also 440 gallons of tar, 450 gallons of gasoline, 5 Ox carts, 2 Viet Cong structures and 4 hand grenades were destroyed.

Company B and C joined Company A in the area and continued to find additional supplies.

30 October 1966 - The battalion conducted limited search and destroy operations around the supply cache.

31 October 1966 - Elements of the battalion conducted search and destroy operation vininity XT4550. The

2036

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

battalion suffered casualties vicinity XT438498 as a result of sniper fire and claymore mine. The search and destroy mission continued and 83.5 tons of rice, 9000 pounds of tobacco, 1 CHICOM Rifle, 300 "D" handle shovels, 600 gallons of cooking oil and 1500 pounds of beans were found.

1 November 1966 - The 2d Battalion 1st Infantry secured the rice cache and conducted saturated patrolling within one thousand meters of the base while personnel from the 8th Support Battalion worked to load the find on CH-47 for evacuation. Company C 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry found 55 tons of rice and 15 tons of beans while searching the area in the vicinity of XT4450.


2 November 1966 - A total of 843 tons of rice had been captured as a result of the operation conducted by units assigned or attached to the brigade.

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LTL
19

SONG SAIGON



0 50 100 150 200 250

METERS


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TAB "E"

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BENGLI
16

45



50 100 150 200 250
SCALE METERS

TAF E''

43


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49

L
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B

UNCLASSIFIED



TAB "G"

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LTL
19

SÔNG SAIGÓN

LZ 2


AXIS RED

AXIS BLUE

AXIS WHITE

AXIS PURPLE

LTL
19




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TAB "H"

3 NOV

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0 500 1000
SCALE METERS

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB I